

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 03178 01 OF 02 120009Z
ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EA-06 SP-02 NSC-05 PM-03 L-01
INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 ABF-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00
DODE-00 /045 W
-----062606 120025Z /64
P 120002Z AUG 78
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2849
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03178

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, UNGA, UNSC, JA
SUBJECT: UN FINANCES: JAPAN'S DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED ON
FINANCES

REF: TOKYO 13907

1. IN FOLLOW UP ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY MAYNES' RECENT
CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT IN TOKYO (REFTEL), POLMIN
CALLED ON MINISTER KATO AND POLCOUNS ONDA AT THE
JAPANESE MISSION AUGUST 8. POLMIN ASKED JUN TO AMPLIFY
THEIR THINKING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIONS THEY
DESIRE TO MEET THEIR BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL NEEDS IN
TOKYO.

2. KATO REFERRED TO THE STATEMENT OF JAPANESE REP AKASHI
IN THE FIFTH COMMITTEE DURING THE EIGHTH SPECIAL SESSION
CRITICIZING THE LACK OF CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNTRIES
LIKE JAPAN CONCERNING THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
UNIFIL OPERATION. KATO SAID THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE
AKASHI STATEMENT TO BE STRONG AND DID NOT INTEND IT TO
POSE A THREAT OF JAPANESE UNCOOPERATIVENESS IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03178 01 OF 02 120009Z

FINANCING OF NECESSARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. JUN, IN
FACT, "SOFTENED" THE STATEMENT TO A GENERALIZED COMPLAINT
SPECIFICALLY OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR US OBJECTIVES IN
THE COUNCIL WHICH JAPAN SUPPORTED. AS ONE OF THE
LARGEST FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE UN BUDGET AND TO
ASSESSED BUDGETS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
SPECIFICALLY, HOWEVER, JAPAN WOULD FIND IT APPROPRIATE

AND GRATIFYING IF THE UN WERE TO CONSULT WITH LARGE CONTRIBUTORS LIKE JAPAN IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT IT CONSULTS WITH TROOP AND MATERIEL CONTRIBUTORS. THIS CONCERN OF COURSE RELATES MOST PARTICULARLY TO PERIODS WHEN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTORS LIKE JAPAN ARE NOT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEREFORE NOT INVOLVED IN THE CONSULTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS BY WHICH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE ORGANIZED. KATO SAID JAPAN WOULD BE PLEASED IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO UNDERTAKE SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN A TIMELY FASHION. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT JAPAN WOULD THINK IT APPROPRIATE AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMFORTABLE IF SUCH CONSULTATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH OTHER MAJOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AS WELL AS JAPAN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDENTIFICATION OF "MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS" MAY HAVE SOME SENSITIVITY IN IT, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS AN INSUPERABLE OBSTACLE TO LOW-KEY CONSULTATIONS.

3. KATO WAS FORCED TO LEAVE THE MEETING AT THIS POINT, BUT ONDA CARRIED ON WITH A FURTHER DISCUSSION BASED UPON HIS PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE INTERESTS UNDERLYING THE AKASHI STATEMENT AND JAPAN'S CURRENT DESIRE FOR A CONSULTATIVE TIE WITH THE UN. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN TOKYO AND EVEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE ITSELF HAS NEVER THOUGHT THROUGH THE LONGER TERM
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 03178 01 OF 02 120009Z

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ISSUE. HE REFERRED TO MAYNES' POINT MADE DURING THE RECENT BILATERALS IN TOKYO THAT THE US FEELS STRONGLY THAT THERE MUST BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS TO LAUNCH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. ONDA SAID THEIR RECORD OF THE TOKYO DISCUSSION MAKES THIS "THEORETICAL" POINT VERY CLEAR, AND ONDA PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT IT IS PROPER THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL THEORETICAL DIFFERENCES THAT MAY EXIST IN THEIR WAY OF LOOKING AT THE COUNCIL AND THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITS DECISIONS.

4. ONDA'S DISCOURSE WAS BASED ON THE OBVIOUS THEORY THAT THE CHARTER INTENDED THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CONTROL THE PURSE STRINGS. THE CHARTER PROVIDES FOR REVIEW BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS (ACABQ) AND APPROPRIATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS MEANS THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS WERE INTENDED TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN ARISING FROM SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS. JAPAN'S EMPHASIS UPON THE THEORETICAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OBVIOUSLY RELATES TO THE AT LEAST

SHORT-TERM IMPOSSIBILITY OF JAPAN'S OBTAINING A LEADER-SHIP ROLE (AS A PERMANENT MEMBER) IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ONDA SAID HE BELIEVES THAT MOST OF THE UN COMMUNITY TENDS TO URGE MORE UN DECISIONS INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTEXT FOR THE SAME REASONS. FOR MOST MEMBER STATES, IN FACT, THEIR SENSE OF PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE IS FAR LESS THAN JAPAN'S.

5. ONDA DENIED THAT JAPAN SEEKS A VETO POWER OVER SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER UN FINANCIAL DECISIONS. THE US CAN FEEL CONFIDENT THAT JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 03178 02 OF 02 120011Z
ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EA-06 SP-02 NSC-05 PM-03 L-01
INR-05 CIAE-00 ABF-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DODE-00 /045 W
-----062614 120026Z /64

P 120002Z AUG 78
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2850
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03178

LIMDIS

STRONGLY THE LAUDABLE OBJECTIVES OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DESPITE THE WELL-KNOWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND PRIME MINISTER FACE IN MAINTAINING SOLID JAPANESE BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR EXPENSIVE UN PROGRAMS OVER WHICH JAPAN HAS SO LITTLE INFLUENCE. NONETHELESS, AS A FREQUENT NON-MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL THAT HAPPENS TO BE THE SECOND OR THIRD LARGEST CONTRIBUTOR TO THESE OPERATIONS, JAPAN BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO IT AND APPROPRIATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WERE TO TOUCH BASE WITH SUCH MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS AND KEEP THEM INFORMED ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS LIKE UNIFIL AND UNTAG. ONDA ADDED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN USUN AND JUN, THEY HAVE NO COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LEVEL OF FACTUAL INFORMATION THEY ARE RECEIVING AND DO NOT EXPECT THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE OPERATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY

GENERAL. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE GESTURE, AGAINST THE PARTIALLY THOUGHT-OUT VIEW OF THE SYSTEM AMONG MEMBER STATES LIKE JAPAN, HOWEVER, WOULD MAKE THE COSMETIC EFFORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MAJOR DONOR NATIONS GRATIFYING AND POSSIBLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03178 02 OF 02 120011Z

HELPFUL IN GUARANTEEING THE POSITIVE RESPONSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS.

6. POLMIN EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE AMERICAN VIEW OF THESE MATTERS ALONG LINES OF OUR DISCUSSION IN TOKYO. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ONDA'S PERSONAL CANDOR AND ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD NOT BE QUOTING HIM IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. HE URGED, HOWEVER, THAT WE CONTINUE TO KEEP OUR DIFFERENCES IN MIND FOR THE FUTURE. POLMIN ALSO SAID HE THOUGHT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE WHAT IT COULD DO TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARIAT TO UNDERTAKE TIMELY, LOW-KEY CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN AND OTHER MAJOR DONOR STATES.

7. COMMENT: THE JAPANESE CLEARLY SEE THEIR DESIRE FOR A CONSULTATIVE LINK WITH THE UN IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR LONG-TERM, MORE BASIC EFFORT TO ENHANCE JAPAN'S STATUS AND INFLUENCE IN THE UN SYSTEM. THEIR PROPOSAL, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD GIVE THEM NO MORE INFLUENCE OVER THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS THAN THEY -- AND IN FACT, WE -- NOW HAVE THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN THE ACABQ AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

8. IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST -- OR OF THAT OF JAPAN -- TO ENCOURAGE CREATION OF A NEWLY INSTITUTIONALIZED INTERMEDIATE STAGE OF CONSULTATIONS ON FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER UN BODIES' DECISIONS. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST, HOWEVER, TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE JAPANESE TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

9. WE THINK WE SHOULD FOLLOW THROUGH WITH A QUIET CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 03178 02 OF 02 120011Z

APPROACH TO THE SECRETARIAT TO ENCOURAGE AN EFFORT TO TOUCH BASE WITH THE JAPANESE AS THE FINANCIAL PICTURE RELATING TO SUCH MAJOR OPERATIONS AS UNTAG DEVELOPS. WE WOULD BASE OUR APPROACH ON THE COMMON-SENSE DESIRABILITY

OF KEEPING SUCH MAJOR DONORS IN POSITION TO HELP FACILITATE REQUIRED ACABQ AND ASSEMBLY ACTIONS. WE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING A FULL LIST OF "MAJOR DONORS" UNLESS THE SECRETARIAT BROACHED IT AND IN ANY EVENT WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST ANOTHER MECHANISM FORMAL OR OTHERWISE. IN ADDITION TO A QUIET CHAT WITH URQUHART, WE WOULD WANT TO TALK WITH USYG FOR ADMINISTRATION GEORGE DAVIDSON.

10. WE SHOULD INFORM THE JAPANESE OF OUR EFFORTS, NOT LEAD THEM TO THINK WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RAM SUCH AN IDEA DOWN THE THROATS OF THE SECRETARIAT AND LEAVE NO DOUBT IN THEIR MINDS THAT WE CONTINUE TO VIEW PUBLIC COMMENTS SUCH AS THEY MADE AT THE EIGHTH SPECIAL SESSION AS THE ENEMY OF THIS EFFORT AND EFFECTIVE EFFICIENT PEACEKEEPING. WE SHOULD ALSO TELL THE JAPANESE THAT WE HOPE MOFA WILL REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE FINANCE MINISTRY AND SIMILAR SKEPTICS THAT JAPAN'S REPRESENTATION ON THE ACABQ IS AN IMPORTANT TANGIBLE ASSET IN THE UN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

11. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S GO-AHEAD FOR THIS INFORMAL APPROACH TO THE SECRETARIAT. WELLS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LOBBYING, CONSULTATIONS (UN), FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USUNN03178
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780329-0868
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780869/aaaacud.tel
Line Count: 247
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2e050e64-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 78 TOKYO 13907
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1754473
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: UN FINANCES: JAPAN'S DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED ON FINANCES
TAGS: MARR, EFIN, JA, UNGA, UNSC, UNIFIL
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2e050e64-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014